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Conflict Resolution
by Michael A. Hertzberg*
Brian E. McGill**
The volume and importance of international trade has expanded
significantly in the past decade-a largely positive development. As
might be expected, however, a parallel growth in the number and com-
plexity of commercial disputes has arisen to challenge the existing dis-
pute settlement mechanisms. Thus, to meet this challenge, new systems
of dispute resolution have been designed.
In the views of many, arbitration has begun to supplant the court
system as the favored means to resolve contract disputes among private
parties. International commercial disputes can also arise between a pri-
vate party and a foreign government regarding the private party's prod-
ucts. In such situations a relatively new mechanism may prove helpful to
the private parties that believe their products are being treated unfairly
or being wrongfully excluded by a foreign government. Section 901 of
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979' provides such a mechanism whereby
an American business can petition the U.S. Government to enforce rights
to which the private entity may be entitled under the trade agreements
to which the United States is a party.
I. Resolution of Contractual Disputes between Private Parties
In recent years increasing attention has been focused on the interna-
tional commercial contract. Sophisticated contractual provisions and a
variety of alternative legal options pertaining to most commercial pos-
sibilities have become the contractual tools of trade for the international
commercial attorney. Although the variety of subject matter, parties,
and national, legal and cultural differences which may be reflected in an
international commercial contract make such contracts more difficult to
standardize, the use of "boilerplate" language is not uncommon. It often
appears that great thought, effort, and originality are applied to the basic
commercial provisions of the contract while boilerplate is resorted to for
the non-commercial "legalese". Frequently included is a boilerplate dis-
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1966, Colgate University; J.D., 1969, George Washington University.
** Associate, Harris, Berg & Creskoff, Washington, D.C.; B.A. History, 1977, Capital Uni-
versity, Columbus, Ohio; J.D., 1980, Georgetown University Law Center.
I Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 295 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (Supp. III 1979)).
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pute resolution clause. Yet the use of boilerplate for these important pro-
visions without consideration of the available options and forms of
resolution of a particular dispute entails significant risk and should be
avoided. In fact, the dispute resolution clause should be as carefully
planned as any of the basic commercial terms of the international con-
tract. Carefully drafted provisions will enhance the prospects of success-
ful dispute resolution. This article reviews the options available and
considers the paramount issues involved in choosing an appropriate dis-
pute resolution clause.
A. Resolution by a Court System
In the absence of an arbitration clause, the conflicting parties will
find themselves in court. Invariably, each party prefers that its own
court system resolve the dispute. This universal desire stems from the not
unfounded belief that more favorable treatment, or at least no less
favorable treatment, can be obtained in one's own system. A practical
consideration is also involved; a party is most familiar with his own legal
system and its procedural requirements. Thus, obtaining the "home
court advantage" is generally considered an important objective.
The opportunity to choose a neutral forum provides certain attrac-
tions. The preselection of a neutral forum allows the parties to agree on
a location that is mutually convenient. A neutral forum may also be
requested to apply its own law or the law of a third country, allowing
flexibility in the choice of substantive law. In order to aid in a more
rational resolution of the dispute, the parties can select a forum that has
expertise in the particular issues and type of contract involved.
Where a corporation of a major developed country has a dispute
with a private party in a developing country, the conflict over forum
could rise above mere preference. The developed country party might be
unfamiliar with the language, law, and legal procedures of the develop-
ing country. Further, the state of law in the developing country might be
such that the developed country party would believe a just resolution
impossible. This has often led to insistence that disputes be settled
outside the borders of the developing country.2 On the other hand, the
developing country party may lack the resources or expertise to become
involved in a dispute in the court system of the developed country. Both
the developed and developing country parties may distrust the other's
system, further complicating the choice of forum for dispute resolution.
This distrust on the part of the developing countries results from basic
2 In some quarters there is a general mistrust between North/South evidenced by numer-
ous differences concerning the New Economic Order. For a general discussion of the basic issues
of this topic, see E. LAszLo, R. BAKER, E. EISENBERG & V. ROMAN, THE OBJECTIVES OF THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1978); K. SAUVANT & H. HASENPFLUG, THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION BETWEEN NORTH
AND SOUTH? (1977); J. SINGH, A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: TOWARD A FAIR
REDISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD'S RESOURCES (1977).
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differences in the philosophical underpinnings of legal systems in the de-
veloped and developing nations. As one commentator has noted:
Concepts such as ownership, contract, corporate personality which
appear quite innocuous within the context of a municipal legal system
may have grave implications when transplanted into the sphere of trans-
national transactions. Second, it is an established legal tradition in Eu-
rope and, to some extent, America, to refer to these legal concepts as the
colourless tools of a legal system. Yet any perceptive observer will con-
cede that these concepts connote discrete value systems of a distinct indi-
vidualistic bias, which are often manifestly inimical to the aspirations
and development goals of new nations. They should therefore not be
accorded the status of immutable and universal postulates.3
The inevitability of preferences means that a neutral forum and the law
of a third country will have to be agreed upon by the parties. Absent the
selection of a neutral forum, it is probable that each party would com-
mence an action in its own court system, proceed to judgment, and then
be unable to execute the judgment due to non-enforcement in the other
party's country.4
I. Enforceability of the Forum Selection Provision5
a. In the United States
Interestingly and somewhat surprisingly, it was not long ago that
contract flexibility concerning forum selection was not possible when
U.S. courts were involved. "It was the traditional view of American
courts that agreements in advance of controversy whose object [was] to
oust the jurisdiction of the courts [were] contrary to public policy and
[would] not be enforced."'6 Specification of another forum would, there-
fore, be ineffective if one of the parties brought suit in a U.S. court which
had otherwise proper jurisdiction over the matter. This judicial circum-
vention of the choice of the contracting parties was eliminated by the
U.S. Supreme Court in The Bremen v. Zapata OfShore Co. 7
In Bremen the Court noted that the "expansion of American business
and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn con-
tracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved
under our laws and in our courts."8
3 Asante, International Transaions and National Development GoaLr, 4 GHANA CiV. SERVICEJ.
1, 6 (1977). Although Dr. Asante was speaking in reference to disputes between states and
private corporations, the observation is equally applicable to the development mentality em-
bodied in private corporations of the developing countries.
4 On these issues, see Mehran & Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-Counti
Judgments in the UnitedStates, 6 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 37 (1974).
5 See genera ly, Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clawes in International and Interstate Contracts, 65 Ky.
L.J. 1 (1976).
6 Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
7 407 U.S. 1 (1972), rev'g sub nom. In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 428 F.2d 888
(1970).
8 407 U.S. at 9.
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The rule laid down in Bremen was that forum selection clauses will
be enforced in U.S. courts unless enforcement is shown by the resisting
party to be unreasonable under the circumstances. 9 This "reasonable-
ness" rule accords with the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of
Laws.' 0 The Court gave an indication of what might be compelling cir-
cumstances for non-enforcement, citing "fraud, undue influence, or over-
whelming bargaining power."" In such situations it would be a
violation of public policy to enforce the contractual agreement regarding
forum selection.
b. In the European Economic Communiy (EEC)
In Europe there is general freedom of choice among the members of
the EEC. Article 17 of the EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters' 2 recognizes
choice of forum clauses if one of the parties is "domiciled" within the
jurisdiction of a convention signatory.' 3 There are two exceptions to this
free choice provision. First, denial of choice may be based on the fact
that a court of a Convention signatory should have exclusive jurisdiction
due to the subject matter of the dispute.' 4 Second, if undue bargaining
9 Id. at 10. For a discussion of the "reasonableness" test, see Lagerman, Choice of Forum
Clauses in Intetnational Contracts: What in Unjust and Unreasonable?, 12 INT'L LAW. 779 (1978).
to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971). "The parties' agreement
as to the place of the action cannot oust a state of judicial jurisdiction, but such an agreement
will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable." Id.
11 407 U.S. at 12. That the forum selected in the contract was seriously inconvenient to
one of the parties might suggest that the agreement was adhesive, but the party making such a
claim bears a "heavy burden of proof." Id. at 17.
"In such circumstances it should be incumbent on the party seeking to escape his contract
to show that trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he
will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court." Id. at 18.
12 European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, done September 27, 1968, English translation printed in COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH), No. 96 (November 19, 1968), reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 229
(1969).
13 Id. at 235. Art. 52 provides that domicile is to be determined by the court chosen by
reference to the law of the claimed domicile.
14 Id. at 234. Art. 16 provides guidance regarding such subject matter. It states:
The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction regardless of domicile:
(1) in matters involving rights in rem in real property or concerning the
leasing of real property: the courts of the Contracting State in which the real
property is located;
(2) in matters involving the validity, nullity or dissolution of a company or
legal person having its seat in a Contracting State or of decisions of its organs: the
courts of that State;
(3) in matters involving the validity ofentries in public registers: the courts
of the Contracting State in whose territory the registers are kept;
(4) in matters involving the validity of patents, trademarks, designs and
models, as well as of similar rights requiring a filing or registration: the courts of
the Contracting State in whose territory the filing or registration was applied for
or effected or is considered to have been applied for or effected under the terms of
an international convention.
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power or an adhesion contract is involved, the choice will not be
enforced.' 5
2. Forum Selection in the Negotiation Process
A contractual advantage may be obtained by agreement on an ap-
propriate forum, because the forum selected, absent express agreement to
the contrary, will most often apply its own law. Familiarity with the
substantive law of the neutral forum is of primary importance to the
result of future dispute resolution.
Without careful selection, one may be subject to law which will not
provide an adequate remedy. Remedies available upon breach of con-
tract differ significantly from forum to forum. For example, specific per-
formance is not available in France, 16 whereas it is the primary form of
recovery in Japan.' 7
The Bremen case is an excellent example of the utility of a forum
selection clause in protecting a client's interests. In Bremen, the ocean
towage contract provided that "[a]ny dispute arising must be treated
before the London Court of Justice."' 8 The contract also contained two
exculpatory clauses. They provided that: (1) the masters and crews
were not responsible for defaults and/or errors in the navigation of the
tow; (2) that damages suffered by the towed object are "in any case for
account of its owner."' 19 The plaintiff sued in Tampa, Florida, the port
of refuge, alleging negligence and breach of contract. The probability
that the plaintiff could expect no recovery in England was cited by the
U.S. Court of Appeals as a reason for disallowing the forum selection
clause.2 0 The inability to recover was found to be contrary to U.S. pub-
lic policy. The court of appeals based its conclusion on the opinion of an
English maritime law expert that the exculpatory clauses in the contract
would be held "prima facie valid and enforceable" against the plaintiff
in any action maintained in England.2' Additional evidence suggested
that the selection of London as the contractual forum for dispute resolu-
tion was not a random choice. For example, under the applicable liabil-
ity limits, even if the defendant was found liable, recovery was limited in
the English forum to $80,000. By contrast, recovery in Tampa had a
15 Convention of Accession of October 9, 1978, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 304) 77 (1978)
adding section 4, "Jurisdiction over Consumer Contracts" to the Convention on Jurisdiction
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, supra note 12. A current
English language version of the amended convention appears at [1978] 2 COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 1 5015 etseq.
16 C. Civ. art. 1142 [France].
17 Specific performance is available even where the loss may be compensated in money
damages. Kitawgawa, Damages in Contracd for the Sale ofCoodr, 3 L. JAPAN: ANN. 43, 46 (1969).
For other differences in the scope of contract damages between the United States and Japan, see
Ricks, A Comparison of the Scope oContract Damages in the United States andjapan, 12 INT'L LAw. 105
(1978).
38 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972).
'9 Id. at 3 n.2.
20 Se id. at 8.
23 428 F.2d at 895.
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$1,390,000 limitation. 22 When the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately up-
held the enforceability of the forum selection clause, the plaintiff's agree-
ment to the London forum seriously compromised its recovery. Thus, as
Bremen illustrates, it is vital to carefully review the laws in the potential
forum, both to prevent unpleasant surprise and to secure tactical
advantages.
Given the pitfalls of a judicial resolution to the dispute, the question
arises, why select any court forum when arbitration is an available alter-
native? This can best be answered after carefully considering arbitration
as a dispute settlement mechanism.
B. Resolution by Arbitration
It has been contended that neutral forum selection clauses are not
practical.2 3 Underlying this view is the reluctance of neutral courts with
heavy domestic case loads to adjudicate disputes where the parties are
foreigners and have no contacts2 4 with the neutral country. Further, as
was the situation in the United States before Bremen, the national courts
of the parties may not recognize a forum selection clause on public policy
grounds. 25
There are also reasons to prefer arbitration that do not relate to
availability of a judicial forum. The resort to the courts implies an ad-
versarial proceeding in which emotions are likely to run high. Such an
atmosphere does not produce a climate conducive to further contracts
between the parties. Further, if a long-term contract is involved, the par-
ties may desire, and for practical reasons may be forced, to continue per-
formance of the contract while the dispute is resolved. Arbitration would
appear to be the more sensible vehicle in such circumstances.26
Arbitration exists in two basic forms, institutional arbitration and
ad hoc arbitration.
. Institutional Arbitration
Arbitration as a mode for dispute resolution has become increas-
ingly popular in the international context. As more parties select the
arbitration alternative, arbitration rules and institutions to administer
them will grow in size and in number. Existing organizations include the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), the London Court of Arbitra-
22 407 U.S. at 8 n.8.
23 See McClelland, Intenational Arbitratiom A Practical Guidefor the Eective Use of the System
for Litigation of Transnational Commercial Dirputes, 12 INT'L LAw. 83 (1978).
24 In Bremen the contract was neither negotiated, executed, nor performed in the neutral
country. Se 407 U.S. at 2-3.
25 Public policy might be framed broadly in terms of undesirability of denying nationals
access to their own courts-or may be framed narrowly as an unconscionable enforcement of
the contract due to the laws of the neutral country.
26 See Holtzman & Bernini, Arbitration i Long-Trm Business Transactions, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1974-1975).
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tion, the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association, and the Indian
Council of Arbitration. Regional rules include the Uniform Rules of
Procedure for 1974 for arbitration in the Arbitration Courts of the Coun-
cil for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)2 7 countries and the rules of
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Asia, and the Far
East.2 8
The most widely utilized international arbitration organization is
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), headquartered in Paris,
but with offices worldwide. The ICC has its own arbitration rules. 29
Perhaps the most influential set of rules, however, is the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules. 30 Be-
cause differing nationalistic and cultural attitudes have engendered a dis-
trust of "someone else's" rules, the UNCITRAL rules were drafted to be
suitable for worldwide use. In fact, the developing countries were signifi-
cantly represented in the rule drafting process. As a result, the UNCI-
TRAL rules have been substantially incorporated into the rules of the
Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission (IACAC). 3 1 Fur-
ther, the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee has recommended
use of the UNCITRAL rules in international commercial contracts. The
intended universal suitability of the rules extends to diverse institutional
systems as well. Acceptance by both capitalist and socialist countries as
well as common and civil law countries was intended. The UNCITRAL
rules may be applied by any institution if the parties have expressed a
desire to be governed by them in the contract.3 2
The preliminary mechanics of arbitration can be demonstrated by
an examination of the ICC procedures. The process begins when a party
to an agreement that includes an ICC arbitration clause makes a de-
mand upon the ICC for initiation of a proceeding.33 The ICC Court of
Arbitration confirms the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, oversees
27 The text of the Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Arbitration Courts at 'the Chambers
of Commerce of the CMEA Countries may be found at I YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION 147 (1976). The CMEA's principal member is the Soviet Union. The Convention on
Settlement by Arbitration of Civil Law Disputes Emerging from Relations of Economic, Scien-
tific and Technical Cooperation was signed in 1972 and has since been ratified by all CMEA
members. Regarding the USSR's arbitration system, see generaliv Lebedev, Union of Sovit Socialist
Republics." The Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission at the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industy,
HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1977).
28 For a list of the various international regional and national institutions which offer
arbitration services, and for copies of their rules of procedure, see I INTERNATIONAL COMMER-
CIAL ARBITRATION (Documents) (1976).
29 The text of the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the ICC may be found at I
YEARBOOK COMMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 157 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ICC Rules].
30 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules, 31 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 35-50, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976), repinted in 2 YEARBOOK COMMER-
CIAL ARBITRATION 161 (1977) [hereinafter cited as UNCITRAL Rules].
31 The text of the Rules of Procedure of the IACAC may be found at 3 YEARBOOK COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION 231 (1978).
32 The parties must specifically delineate the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in writing.
UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 30, art. 1.1.
33 ICC Rules, supra note 29, art. 3(1).
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the selection of the arbitrator,3 4 and will designate a situs if the parties
have not done So.35 Once situs and arbitrators have been selected, the
arbitration itself can begin.
2. Ad Hoc Arbitration
In an ad hoc agreement the parties may agree on any mediating
body they wish. Further, the parties themselves may develop the proce-
dural rules for the arbitration. The agreement concerning the tribunal
and the rules may be inserted into the ad hoc arbitration clause itself or
may be deferred until a dispute arises.
There are serious drawbacks to the ad hoc approach, however. De-
signing the mechanics of an arbitration will be more time consuming
than merely selecting the ICC or UNCITRAL rules. If deferred until
some time after the dispute has arisen and the parties have become an-
tagonistic, agreement on the mechanics will be even more trying. Thus,
as between "institutional" and "ad hoc" arbitration, institutional arbi-
tration appears generally preferable.
C Comparison of Institutional Arbitration and Court Proceed'ngs-An
Anal'ysis of the Advantages and Disadvantages
I. The Decision Maker
a. Capability
In a judicial system, the decision maker is usually a professional
judge experienced in the resolution of disputes. An arbitrator, however,
may have comparatively little experience. The type of experience that
the arbitrator has had may also be different from that of a judge, a factor
which may affect the resolution of a dispute. If a businessman is the
arbitrator, the presentation of involved legal arguments may be inhib-
ited. The absence of purely legal arguments is no loss if their use would
lead to an unfair result. If, however, the arbitration is to be governed by
a substantive body of law, as opposed to the amiable compositeur pro-
cess,3 6 and legal construction will be important, the parties would proba-
bly feel more comfortable with an experienced judge. If an
inexperienced arbitrator deals unsuccessfully with a complicated legal is-
sue, the award rendered may not only be unfair and incorrect, but it may
also be of questionable enforceability.
An example of such an enforceability problem can be found in the
old "stated-case" doctrine of the United Kingdom.3 7 This doctrine per-
mitted review of the arbitrator's legal reasoning on the theory that
34 Id. art. 2.
35 Id. art. 12.
36 Se notes 73-77 and accompanying text, infra.
37 See generally, Hacking, The "Stated Case" Aboh'Aed: The United Kingdom Arbitration Act of
1979, 14 INT'L LAw. 95 (1980).
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"[wihen there are persons untrained in law, and especially when . . .
they allow persons trained in law to address them on legal points, there is
every probability of their going wrong . "... ,,3 Therefore, exclusion of
judicial review of the arbitral decision was previously considered to be
"contrary to public policy."' 39
Under the United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 1979,40 however, the
parties to a nondomestic arbitration agreement 4' may provide at the
time of contracting, with three specific exceptions, that an arbitration
award will not be judicially reviewable. 42 As is the case in all instances
of arbitration, the law of the forum should be followed precisely. Hence,
the renunciation of judicial review should be tailored to the Arbitration
Act, 1979, when the London forum is chosen.
A judicial system will provide a decision maker who is a legal expert,
but a governing arbitral institution has the flexibility to appoint the most
knowledgable decision maker to resolve the particular issues involved in
the dispute. While a judge may be more familiar with a broad range of
substantive law, it is less likely that the court systems will be able to
provide competent legal decision makers who are also experts in the in-
volved fields. Thus, the type of contract considered should influence the
choice of the decision maker. For example, arbitration of issues involving
technical or scientific problems may often be preferable to judicial reso-
lution of disputes involving such matters.
b. Availability
Since dockets are crowded with domestic cases, delays can be ex-
pected. In some court systems trials may proceed in segments making
appearance before the tribunal in an international case a source of con-
tinuing inconvenience.
Although arbitration is certain to proceed more rapidly than a seg-
mented trial, its expedition should not be overemphasized. Arbitrators
are rarely available on a full-time basis, and proceedings must be tailored
to the arbitrator's schedule. When a panel of three arbitrators is utilized,
as is often the case, the problem is exacerbated.
38 Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmidt & Co., [1922] 2 K.B. 478, 488.
39 Id. at 487.
40 For a discussion of the provisions of the statute, see Shenton & Toland, London as a Venue
for Internaiional Arbitration." The Arbitration Act, 1979, 12 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 643 (1980).
41 A nondomestic arbitration agreement contemplates that at least one of the parties is not
a citizen of the United Kingdom.
42 If the contract involves admiralty, insurance, or commodities and the contract does not
provide that the dispute is to be governed by non-British law, judicial review may be excluded
only if the agreement is made after arbitration has commenced. U.K. Arbitration Act, 1979, c.
42, § 4(1).
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2. Evidence
a. Di'covey
One of the often cited disadvantages of arbitration-particularly
and perhaps uniquely from an American perspective-is the more lim-
ited availability of discovery. A judge generally has significantly more
authority to compel production than does an arbitrator. The ICC rules
make no mention of discovery rights. 43 The UNCITRAL rules, however,
provide that "[a]t any time during the arbitral proceedings the tribunal
may require the parties to produce documents, exhibits or other evidence
within such a period of time as the tribunal shall determine."' 4" There-
fore, the amount of discovery permitted, or compelled, will depend on
the predilection of the arbitrator, a predilection that will often be deter-
mined by the arbitrator's more extensive familiarity with his own system.
The discovery distinction is likely to be greatest when an American court
proceeding is contrasted with an arbitration conducted by an arbitrator
from a civil law jurisdiction.
b. Witnesses
Differences may also result in the form in which evidence is heard.
The ICC rules provide that the arbitrator is to study the "written sub-
missions of the parties and all documents relied upon . . . .- 4 He must'
also hear the parties together if so requested by one of the parties.46 Tes-
timony of witnesses, however, is provided only at the arbitrator's discre-
tion.4 7 Under the UNCITRAL rules, "[i]f either party so requests at any
stage of the proceedings, the arbitral tribunal shall hold, hearings for the
presentation of evidence by witnesses, including expert witnesses. .. .
Under both sets of rules, however, the arbitral tribunal is free to deter-
mine the manner in which the witnesses are examined. 49 If civil law
arbitrators are selected, it is probable that they will do the questioning
rather than the parties, a factor that may reduce the utility and effective-
ness of certain witnesses for American attorneys.
c. Rules of Evidence
Arbitral rules do not contain detailed rules of evidence. The arbi-
tral tribunal, however, will normally consider the admissibility, rele-
vance, materiality, and weight of evidence in the process of resolving the
dispute.50 Absent a choice of a procedural code of evidence to direct it,
43 See ICC Rules, supra note 29.
44 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 30, art. 24.3.
45 ICC Rules, supra note 29, art. 14.1.
46 Id. The arbitrator may also hear the parties on his own motion.
47 Id.
4 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 30, art. 15.2.
49 See id. art. 25.4; ICC RULES, supra note 29, art. 14.1.
50 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 30, art. 25.6.
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the arbitral panel will probably utilize the rules of evidence most famil-
iar to it.
There are, of course, pronounced differences among judicial systems
regarding treatment of witnesses and extent of discovery. If a common
law neutral forum is selected, its procedure will differ markedly from a
code system jurisdiction. The code countries have a marked preference
for the development of the case by the judge rather than by the adversa-
ries and for decisions based on documents rather than testimony of wit-
nesses. Individual arbitrators are likely to draw heavily on their own
experience and on methods taught them in their respective civil or com-
mon law systems in the arbitration process. Under the UNCITRAL
rules, "the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such a man-
ner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with
equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a
full opportunity of presenting his case."'5 ' The ICC provides similar au-
thority in the absence of agreement to the contrary by the parties. 52
The ICC also provides an opportunity, once arbitration has been
invoked, to formulate procedural rules. Under the ICC Rules, at the
initial stage of the proceedings the arbitrator is to draw up "Terms of
Reference." '53 These "Terms" include identification of parties, places, is-
sues, and also "particulars of the applicable procedural rules."' 54 Hence,
any attorney may attempt to rectify any perceived procedural inade-
quacy through hiswritten proposal for the "Terms."
3. Cost
The conventional wisdom is that arbitration is less costly than judi-
cial resolution. Cost savings are generally attributed to faster resolution
and earlier settlements. Drawn out proceedings, which are increasingly
characteristic of American jurisprudence, are thought to be avoided. It
must be noted, however, that extensive discovery is the prime cause of
protracted litigation. If discovery is employed to the same extent in arbi-
tration as it is in many judicial proceedings, the main cost savings associ-
ated with arbitration will be lost.
Absent a speedy settlement, an arbitration may become costly be-
cause it will entail certain costs that are not associated with litigation. In
a judicial system, the judge and court functionaries are public servants.
As such, their salaries and the costs associated with their work are borne
by the government. 55 In institutional arbitration, the costs of the pro-
51 Id. art. 15.1.
52 ICC Rules, supra note 29, art. 11.
53 Id. art. 13.1.
54 Id.
55 Under some systems, costs may also be assessed where it is determined that the judicial
system has been abused.
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ceedings are passed on to the parties.56 Further, this cost must be borne
at the outset, as most institutions require a deposit of estimated fees
before initiation of the proceedings. This requirement may be particu-
larly burdensome where the respondent refuses, for one reason or an-
other, to deposit his share of the costs. The ICC requires that the
claimant deposit fees for both parties in such a situation. 5 7 There is a
similar provision in the UNCITRAL rules. 58 Costs will also obviously
increase when three arbitrators are used rather than one.
D. Enforcement of Agreement to Arbitrate
Today, the courts of most countries will permit parties to agree to
arbitrate disputes. Historically, however, under English and American
common law, arbitration agreements were considered unenforceable be-
cause they improperly ousted jurisdiction of the courts. This policy en-
ded in the United States with the adoption of the Arbitration Act of
1925. 59
United States courts, however, retain a bias in favor of judicial reso-
lution of certain issues. Issues often considered non-arbitral include the
validity of the arbitration clause itself and the question of fraud in the
inducement to contract. 6° Some specialized matters such as patent valid-
ity and antitrust liability are also of particular concern to the courts.
Even these areas of jurisdiction may not long remain sacrosanct, how-
ever. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. ,6' estab-
lished that certain securities law issues previously within the sole domain
of the courts need not necessarily be litigated in the U.S. courts. In
Scherk, an American corporation that performed the majority of its busi-
ness in the United States purchased three businesses, complete with
trademarks, from a German citizen. The contract contained an arbitra-
tion clause providing that any controversy or claim arising under the
contract would be arbitrated before the ICC in Paris. The American
corporation later brought suit in the United States, alleging that the
56 See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 29, app. II; UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 30, arts. 38-
40.
57 ICC Rules, supra note 29, art. 9.2, .4.
58 The UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 30, art. 41.4, provides that:
If the required deposits are not paid in full within 30 days after the receipt of the
request, the arbitral tribunal shall so inform the parties in order that one or an-
other of them may make the required payment. If such payment is not made, the
arbitral tribunal may order the suspension or termination of the arbitral
proceedings.
59 Ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976)). Section 2 pro-
vides that arbitration agreements in international commercial contracts "shall be valid, irrevo-
cable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract." For a discussion of prior U.S. policy, see H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
1, 2 (1924).
60 Fraud of any type, under the English Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c.27, § 24(2),
enabled either party to demand a court hearing of the case. The Arbitration Act of 1979, supra,
note 42, abolished this right for international arbitration agreements.
61 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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seller made fraudulent representations concerning his trademark rights
in violation of Securities and Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5. The plaintiff prevailed before the District Court and the Court of
Appeals. The Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that an agree-
ment to arbitrate before a specified tribunal was "in effect, a specialized
kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but
also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute. '6 2 The Court
reiterated the language of Bremen stating: "We cannot have trade and
commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our
terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts."'6 3
The status of enforceability of arbitration agreements in other coun-
tries will vary. Generally, any signatory to the U.N. Convention on Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Arbitration Awards64 gives at least prima
facie recognition of the enforceability of arbitration agreements. Article
II of the Convention provides that:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in re-
spect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, con-
cerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a mat-
ter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the
meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer
the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the said agreement is null
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.6 5
In the United Kingdom, parties to international arbitration agreements
may exclude judicial review at any time except as to agreements which
could give rise to admiralty disputes, or are in insurance or commodity
contracts. 66 When considering the dispute resolution clause, however, it
is prudent to explore the domestic laws of the other party regarding en-
forcement of arbitration agreements. If the parties desire arbitration of
all issues, a strongly worded exclusivity clause drafted to conform to the
domestic laws of the arbitration forum should be included in the agree-
ment. At the least, such a clause will enhance the potential that the
parties will be able to successfully enter arbitration proceedings.
E. Formulation and Proper Management of the Arbitration Clause
When judicial proceedings are chosen, there is no need to specify the
procedural rules. The court system will have its own procedure that can-
not generally be modified or changed even if desired. If arbitration is the
62 Id. at 519.
63 Id.
64 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
65 Id., art. 11(1), (3).
66 U.K. Arbitration Act of 1979, § 3, see note 42 and accompanying text, supra. See also
Hacking, supra note 37 at 101.
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choice, however, it is sensible for counsel to design an arbitration clause
that will minimize the numerous non-substantive disputes which may
arise.
The arbitration clause should cover as many procedural matters as
possible since agreement is more likely while the parties are still on rela-
tively good terms and negotiations can proceed apace. Once a dispute
has arisen, settlement of the procedural aspects of the arbitration can be
the most time consuming part of the arbitration process and can detract
from resolution or settlement of the dispute itself.
1. Conduct of the Proceeding
Institutional arbitrators have their own rules. The ICC Rules pro-
vide a procedural framework. Under ICC arbitrations, the procedure is
developed in part under the "Terms of Reference."'67 It is imperative
that the attorney participate fully in the drafting of these "Terms".
If ad hoc arbitration is chosen, any set of rules previously mentioned
might be selected. The American Arbitration Association rules are prob-
ably the most familiar to American corporations.6 The UNCITRAL
Rules, however, may gain the widest degree of acceptance in the future.
2. Forum
The selection of the situs is determined by consideration of a
number of factors, such as the convenience of the parties, the law of the
locale, and the terms of the arbitration agreement. The site should be
convenient for obvious practical reasons. It is helpful if the witnesses,
parties, experts, and their respective logistical support can easily reach
the forum. If a factory or large quantity of goods is the subject of the
dispute and inspection is likely to be necessary for resolution, easy access
to the evidence should be considered. Convenience is also a matter of
legal import. If the selected forum is unreasonably inconvenient, a recal-
citrant party may bring an action in the courts to prevent either the
arbitration from taking place or execution of the arbitral award.
If the parties wish to have all matters pertaining to their dispute
resolved by arbitration, it is important that the local courts in the juris-
diction will respect this decision. The local law is also important for
other less obvious reasons. For example, the award may be subject to
taxation, as is the case in some cantons of Switzerland. If the other party
insists on such a forum, an agreement to share the tax burden might be
in order.
67 ICC Rules, supra note 29, art. 13.
68 See Straus, International Arbitration Under the Rules of the American Arbitraton Assoaatton, I
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Collected Papers) 188 (1974). The text of the
AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules may be found at 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION (Documents) 329 (1976).
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3. Choice/Avoidance of Substantive Law
a. Choice of Substantive Law
In arbitration the law which is to apply to the merits must be se-
lected. If no law is designated, the arbitrator may deem the parties to
have impliedly chosen the law of the arbitration situs. 69 Alternatively,
the absence of a designated body of substantive law could lead to use of
the law that the arbitrator believes to be most relevant or the law with
which he is most familiar.70
Selection of the substantive law in arbitration can be used creatively
and for the benefit of the client. There should be careful consideration of
this point by counsel prior to the agreement. If non-U.S. substantive law
is applied, resort to U.S. courts for enforcement of concepts not found in
the chosen law will not be possible.
7
"
b. Avoidance of Substantive Law--The Amiable
Compositeur Process
A study of the vagaries of conflicting legal systems may be avoided if
the parties opt to designate the arbitrator an "amiable compositeur". An
amiable compositeur need not refer to any particular body of law.
Rather he attempts to bring the parties to an equitable resolution of the
dispute through common sense application of justice. Such an option
would likely work best in the Far East where friendly negotiation is the
preferred mode of dispute resolution. However, the term and the prac-
tice is most often found in Western Europe. Both the ICC and UNCI-
TRAL rules provide for selection of the amiable compositeur process. 72
Freedom from strict legal constraints has been suggested as the es-
sence of the arbitration process. One commentator, Peter Ehrenhaft, has
forcefully maintained that the amiable compositeur should always be
69 The Supreme Court has noted that "[u]nder some circumstances, the designation of
arbitration in a certain place might also be viewed as implicitly selecting the law of that place to
apply to that transaction." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.13 (1974).
70 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 30, art. 33(l) provides: "The arbitral tribunal shall ap-
ply the law designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Failing such
designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of
laws rules which it considers applicable."
Similarly, ICC Rules, supra note 29, art. 13(3) provides: "The parties shall be free to deter-
mine the law to be applied by the arbitrator to the merits of the dispute. In the absence of any
indication by the parties as to the applicable law, the arbitrator shall apply the law designated
as the proper law by the rule of conflict which he deems appropriate."
Both UNCITRAL and the ICC Rules provide for reference to terms of the contract and
usages in the trade, the UNCITRAL placing more emphasis on these matters. Under UNCI-
TRAL, the arbitrator is to decide in accordance with the terms and usages, UNCITRAL Rules,
supra note 30, art. 33(3); whereas under the ICC Rules the arbitrator merely has to take account of
them. ICC Rules, supra note 29, art. 13(5).
71 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
72 ICC Rules, supra note 29, art. 13 .1(g); UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 30, art. 33.
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utilized in arbitration, citing three reasons in support of this position. 73
First, a provision requiring the arbitrator to apply substantive law in-
troduces an element of uncertainty into the agreement. 74 Complete
knowledge of the chosen law is unlikely in the international context.
Further, without a firm grounding in the conflict of law rules of the cho-
sen law, one may later find that the specific substantive concepts desired
will not be applied. Also, there is always the possibility that the chosen
law will change between the time the choice of law is made and the time
the dispute arises. Hence, there is the chance that overlooked or unantic-
ipated arbitrary rules will be applied that will inequitably benefit one of
the parties. Regarding this point, Ehrenhaft concludes:
If a contract is intended to record the parties' mutual understandings of
their expectations, the bases for settling disputes thereunder should simi-
larly adhere as much as possible to that privately created law. The
arbitrary rules of a remote and, as far as these parties are concerned,
uninformed legislature or court are almost by definition
inappropriate. 75
Second, by choosing a body of substantive law any speed, efficiency,
or cost advantages which might apply to the arbitration may be ne-
gated. 76 Before the work of actually resolving the dispute can begin, the
relevant law and its proper application must be determined. The focus
may be shifted from finding an equitable resolution of the specific dis-
pute to determining or resolving legal issues or procedures.
Third, if the parties desire a legal interpretation under a body of
substantive law, it may be more sensible to choose a court proceeding
before a judge who is certain to be familiar with the law. 77 Furthermore,
if arbitration is chosen, there is the danger that the award will not be
enforced if the arbitrator grossly misinterprets or improperly applies the
chosen law. 78
For fairness and efficiency, Ehrenhaft would have his arbitrator re-
solve the dispute by considering the contract language first and then
trade custom. Throughout the proceedings, an analysis of the equities
involved in the particular dispute would pervade the arbitrator's appli-
cation of language and custom. 7 9
For a number of reasons, use of an amiable compositeur is not uni-
73 Ehrenhaft, Efctivt International Commercial Arbitration, 9 LAW & POL'Y IN-'L BUS. 1191
(1977).
74 Id. at 1210.
75 Id.
76 1d. at 1210-11.
77 Id. at 1211.
78 An arbitration award must be upheld unless it can be shown that there was partiality
on the part of the arbitrator, that the arbitrator exceeded his authority, or that the award was
rendered in "manifest disregard of the law." Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arbitration
Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 252 (9th Cir. 1973) (citations omitted).
79 Ehrenhaft, supra note 73, at 1211.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 293
versally highly regarded.8 0 An amiable compositeur may have great dif-
ficulty bringing the parties to a resolution they will all consider just and
equitable. Moreover, an amiable compositeur may be a hindrance in a
case involving a complicated or close question because the parties would
have no body of law on which to accurately assess the relative merits of
their positions, which is typically the starting point for reaching a mutu-
ally acceptable compromise.8 ' The absence of a body of law in the deci-
sion making process may also affect the enforceability of the award. A
court reviewing an award of an amiable compositeur may look unfavora-
bly on a decision which is totally void of any familiar substantive legal
considerations, especially if it is a court in the home country of the losing
party.
i. The Clause
The ICC model arbitration clause reads: "All disputes arising in
connection with the present contract shall be finally settled under the
Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with said
Rules. '8 2 It is obvious that this clause does not begin to cover the issues
raised in this article. In effect, it says simply "let's arbitrate."
The UNCITRAL model clause is little better, but it adds a re-
minder that the parties may want to cover other issues. It reads:
Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this con-
tract, or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as at
present in force.
Note-Parties may wish to consider adding:
(a) The appointing authority shall be . . . (name of institution or
person);
(b) The number of arbitrators shall be. .. (one or three);
(c) The place of arbitration shall be . . . (town or country);
(d) The language(s) to be used in the arbitral proceedings shall be
83
This clause does not preclude judicial review and does not make a choice
of substantive law to govern the merits of the dispute. Serious considera-
tion should be given to covering these matters in any arbitration clause
selected.
The ICC Court Rules Booklet also notes the overriding importance
of checking applicable national laws when drafting the clause. It notes
that "the laws of certain countries require that parties to contracts ex-
pressly accept arbitration clauses, sometimes in a precise and peculiar
80 See Higgens, Brown & Roach, halls in Internatonal Commercial Arbitraton, 35 Bus. LAW.
1035, 1041 (1980).
81 Id.
82 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES FOR THE ICC COURT OF ARBrrRA-
TION 6 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as the ICC Court Rules Booklet].
83 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 30, art. 1.1.
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manner."' 4 Compliance with such peculiarities is advisable.
F Enforcement of the Award
Winning the case in court or before an arbitral panel does not in all
cases conclude the dispute. The judgment or award rendered must be
enforced, usually in the national courts of the losing party. When a court
system is involved, this problem falls under the rubric of comity.
L Court Judgments
a. In the United States8 5
t. Comity
Comity permits a foreign judgment to be enforced unless to do so
would violate public policy. This public policy exception will generally
be involved when the proceedings, cause of action, or judgment are seri-
ously offensive to the policy of the enforcing nation. In general, when a
court's conscience is shocked, enforcement may be denied. Because laws
and procedures will vary, a determination of the offensiveness to public
policy will not necessarily turn on procedure. There are, however, three
major issues that are likely to involve the public policy exception in cases
before U.S. courts: lack of jurisdiction, inadequate notice and opportu-
nity to be heard, and fraud.86
In most states, the foreign court's jurisdiction is assumed and the
burden of proof is on the party asserting lack of jurisdiction.8 7 Jurisdic-
tion will be found to be lacking if it was obtained in a manner seriously
violative of American notions of due process. If a forum selection clause
has been made part of the contract, however, the jurisdictional argument
is significantly diminished in light of the enforcement policy of the Sherk
and Bremen cases.88
A violation of public policy will also be found if the losing party has
not received adequate notice of the foreign proceeding. Notice must
have been sufficient as to the nature, time, and the place of proceeding.8 9
If the foreign judgment is obtained by fraud, enforcement may be
denied. Some American courts recognize a distinction between intrinsic
and extrinsic fraud. 9° Thus, in some jurisdictions fraud intrinsic to the
proceedings, such as falsified evidence, would not bring relief from execu-
tion. Where the fraud was extrinsic to the proceedings, recognition
84 ICC Court Rules Booklet, supra note 82, at 6.
85 See generally Mehren & Patterson, supra note 4.
86 Id. at 61-63.
87 See, e.g., In re Malaszenko, 204 F. Supp. 744, 744-45 (D.NJ. 1962).
8 See text accompanying notes 3-11 and 49-51 supra.
89 The UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, § 4(b)(1), provides
that a foreign judgment need not be recognized if the defendant "did not receive notice of the
proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend." This Act was intended to codify the
existing common law regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
90 See id. § 4(b)(2).
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would be denied, however.91 Courts normally look to American fraud
concepts rather than those of the particular foreign jurisdiction involved.
i. Reciprocity
Although the Supreme Court in the 1895 case of Hilton v. Guyot, 92
authorized American courts to consider the existence of reciprocity in the
enforcement of foreign judgments, the concept has since fallen from
favor.9 3 The Supreme Court has not overruled Hilton but has stated that
it is to apply "only in limited circumstances. ' 94 Furthermore, state
courts are not bound by the Hilton decision.9
5
b. In the EEC
Among the EEC nations, foreign judgments are governed by the
Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters.96 Although not effective, the Hague
Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters97 of April 26, 1966 may also be
referred to as it reflects expert opinion on this topic.98
c. The Developing Nations-The Indonesia Example99
The distrust of developed countries by the developing nations is
often reflected in the attitude adopted concerning foreign judgments. In-
91 Extrinsic fraud would include: misrepresentations that the foreign proceeding would be
terminated which induced a party not to participate, Tamimi v. Tamimi, 38 A.D.2d 197, 328
N.Y.S.2d 477 (1972); misstatements regarding location of the parties which affected jurisdiction,
In re Topcuoglu's Will, 11 Misc.2d 859, 174 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1958); and misrepresentations which
affected service of process, Parker v. Parker, 155 Fla. 635, 21 So.2d 141 (1945).
92 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
93 See, e.g., R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw 169-71 (3d ed. 1977); Bleimaier, The
Doctrine of Comity in P rwate International Law, 24 CATH. LAw. 327 (1979); Golumb, Recognition of
Foreign Mone Judgments, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 604 (1969); Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law of
Foreign Judgments, 16 LA. L. REv. 465 (1956).
94 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 411 (1964). The Hilton holding
involved an attempt by a foreign national to enforce an in personam judgment of his country's
courts against a U.S. citizen.
95 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See, e.g., Johnston v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 384, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (1926). See also Bata v. Bata, 39 Del. Ch.
258, 163 A.2d 493 (1960), cert. denied 366 U.S. 964 (1961); Coulborn v. Joseph, 195 Ga. 723, 25
S.E.2d 576 (1943).
Some states, however, have required reciprocity. See, e.g., Hager v. Hager, 1 Ill. App.3d
1047, 274 N.E.2d 157 (1971); Northern Aluminum Co., Ltd. v. Law, 157 Md. 641, 147 A. 715
(1929).
96 Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, supra, note 12.
97 The Hague Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Apr. 26, 1966, reprinted in 5 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
636 (1966); 15 AM. J. COMp. L. 362 (1967).
98 See generaly Zaphiriou, Transational Recognition and Enforcement of Civi/Judgments, 53 No-
TERE DAME LAw. 734 (1978).
99 See generally Hornick, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Indonesia, 18
HARM. INT'L L. J. 97 (1977).
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donesian law, for example, provides that, except as to maritime matters,
judgments rendered by foreign courts may not be executed in Indonesia.
Such cases must be commenced, retried, and decided in an Indonesian
Court. t00
The situation may be slightly altered if there is an agreement con-
senting to foreign jurisdiction. If the foreign judgment does not require
execution on Indonesian property, it can be recognized.' 0 ' Even if a
judgment is recognized, execution is nevertheless prohibited. One possi-
ble remedy to this problem would be to obtain a waiver of invocation of
the prohibition against execution. One commentator has argued, how-
ever, that such a waiver would be ineffective as the law "is a public
rather than private law provision."' 0 2 The commentator goes on to rec-
ommend that a consent to foreign jurisdiction be obtained, as the foreign
judgment may be given evidentiary weight by the Indonesian court.'0 3
The Indonesian provisions are not unique. They illustrate the need
for careful review of the national law and policies which may apply in
particular fact situations.
2. Arbitral Awards
The U.S. position and policy regarding arbitral awards was clarified
in 1970 when the United States ratified the United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.'0 4
The U.S. Senate approved the Convention with several reservations.
These reservations were: (1) that the award be made in the territory of a
Convention party; (2) that the dispute be "commercial" under U.S. law;
and (3) that there be reciprocity. ' 0 5 Most major commercial nations are
now parties to the Convention, although the flags of convenience coun-
tries, Liberia and Panama, are not.'0 6
Under Article V of the Convention, recognition and enforcement of
the award may be denied either at the request of one of the parties or
upon the court's own motion under certain specified circumstances. In
order for the party seeking denial to enlist the court's protection, the
party must offer proof that: (1) the parties were under some incapacity
or that the agreement was not valid under the law of the country where
the award was made or the law to which the parties are subject; (2) there
100 Regulation of Nov. 8, 1947, Stb. 52/1847 and Stb. 63/1849, Engelbrecht 1135 (1960
ed.). Sections 436(1) and 436(2) of Reglement op de Burgelikje Rechtsvordering [BRu.].
101 There are no Indonesian cases permitting such enforcement, but when Indonesian law
is silent, reference to Dutch cases is permissible. In the Bontmantel case, Kihne & An. v. Platt,
[19251 N.J. 91 (H.R. 14-11-1924), a Dutch plaintiffwho was unsuccessful in England was barred
from bringing the same action in a Dutch court.
102 Set Hornick, supra note 99 at 101.
103 Id. at 102.
104 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Pub. L.
No. 91-368, § 1, 84 Stat. 692 (1970) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1976)).
105 S. Res. 313, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CONG. REc. 29,605 (1968).
16 See the notes following 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West Supp. 1981) for a list of signatories.
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was inadequate notice and opportunity to be heard; (3) the award in-
volved matters outside the terms of the submission to arbitration;
(4) there were defects in the procedures used; or (5) the award has not
become binding or has been set aside. 10 7 A court may also deny recogni-
tion and enforcement of the award if it finds that the subject matter of
the dispute is inappropriate for arbitration or is contrary to public policy
under that country's law.' 0 8
The Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of 1927,109 which remains valid as to signatories that have not
acceded to the U.N. Convention," 10 may also be relevant to judicial re-
view. The significance of such a review can be demonstrated by refer-
ence to Indonesia. Holland acceded to the Geneva Convention on behalf
of the Netherland Indies, now Indonesia. The Indonesian Constitution
provides that pre-independence legislation is valid unless specifically re-
voked. Hence, under the terms of the Geneva Convention, Indonesian
courts would have to enforce foreign arbitral awards. I I I This illustration
also suggests the necessity of consulting with foreign counsel at the time
the agreement is drafted.
Most civil law countries require that the arbitrator give a statement
of reasons with the award,1' 2 In fact, there is a trend toward requiring a
statement of reasons which has been encouraged by English passage of
the Arbitration Act of 1979 which abolished the "stated case
doctrine."' t3
II. Disputes between a Private Party and a Foreign Government:
Section 301 and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
Acts of God, market forces, personalities and other factors can cause
problems in a contractual relationship. One especially important poten-
tial source of problems is the application of another country's tax, trade,
or other domestic laws. Imposition of an anti-dumping or countervailing
duty can severely affect the profitability of a contract. Regulatory or
taxing actions can foreclose future contracts by eliminating the potential
107 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra
note 64, art. V(l)(a)-(e).
108 Id. art. V(2)(a)-(b).
109 Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S.
301. 110 Se Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra
note 64, art. VII.
III This conclusion is not free from doubt. When Indonesia became independent, an
Agreement on Transitional measures provided that it would remain bound by international
agreements acceded to by Holland on its behalf, unless such were expressly revoked. The agree-
ment itself was revoked in 1956. See general
, 
Hornick, supra note 99 at 102.
112 The failure to state reasons may provide grounds for invalidation of the award in the
German Federal Republic. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] § 1041(5) (W. Ger.).
113 Seegenerally Hacking, note 37 supra. Previously, if an arbitrator stated his reasons for an
award, he would be subject to a writ of certiorari reviewing his legal reasoning. The court then
had the power to set aside, but not amend, the award.
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for profitability. Since these are government controlled events, they have
generally been beyond the influence of business entities. It is, therefore,
sometimes useful for an American business to enlist the support of the
U.S. Government. Under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974114 busi-
nesses can petition to have the U.S. Government attempt to remove ob-
stacles to commercial activity set in place by foreign governments.
A. Outline of Section 301
. Purpose
The legislative history of the 1979 Trade Agreements Act made
clear the Congressional intent that the United States receive the benefits
that had been agreed upon at the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (MTN). The Senate report stated that the:
benefits to the United States from the various non-tariff agreements ne-
gotiated in the MTN depend very heavily on the vigorous insistence by
the United States that its rights be secured and that other countries
carry out their obligations under the agreements. Absent such insis-
tence, including use of dispute settlement procedures . . . [the agree-
ments] . . . will become largely one-way streets whereby the United
States assumes obligations without reciprocity, and whereby the benefits
for international trade are substantially reduced, especially as the
United States responds to the non-implementation of others. 15
2. Procedure
a. Initiation of a Section 301 Proceeding
The President may take action on his own initiative to protect
American interests" 6 or he may act in response to a petition filed by an
injured party. 1 7 The procedure to be followed in a section 301 action is
administered by the Office of the Trade Representative' 18 (still popu-
larly known as the STR). The 301 petition is filed with the STR's sec-
tion 301 Committee. 119 The petition must indicate the identity of the
parties, the rights being denied, the laws and regulations affected, the
volume of product or service affected, and the general economic impact
of the inhibiting foreign practice.120 The STR, with the advice of the
section 301 Committee, has 45 days after the receipt of the petition to
decide whether or not to initiate an investigation.'21
114 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1976), as amended y Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39
§ 901, 93 Stat. 295 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (Supp. III 1979)).
115 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 236, repritiedt'n [19791 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 381, 622.
116 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1) (Supp. I 1979).
17' Id. § 2411(c)(2).
118 Procedures for complaints filed under 301 can be found at 15 C.F.R. § 2006 (1980).
119 Id. § 2006.0(c).
'20 Id. § 2006.1(a)-(t.
121 Id. § 2006.3.
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b. Consultations
If the STR decides to initiate an investigation, he must request con-
sultations with the foreign country involved.' 22 During the consultation
and dispute settlement process, the STR "shall seek information and ad-
vice from the petitioner and from the appropriate private sector repre-
sentatives."' 23  If the petitioner so requests in his petition, the
information may be conveyed through public hearings. The hearings
must be held within 30 days after the STR's affirmative determination
regarding initiation of the investigation. 24
c. Presidential Action
The President may take action only if he determines that the situa-
tion justifies action and a mutually acceptable agreement cannot be
reached between the United States and the foreign government during
the consultation period. If a trade agreement is involved, the dispute
settlement process contained within the agreement is to be invoked only
if the consultations fail. If no trade agreement is involved, the President
may take whatever action he deems proper after consideration of the ad-
vice derived during the consultation period.
Depending on the type of petition, the STR must make a recom-
mendation of action to the President within seven, eight or twelve
months after initiation of the investigation.' 2 5 Presidential action may
be taken on a nondiscriminatory basis or solely against the products or
services of the foreign country or instrumentality involved. Prior to such
action there must normally be an opportunity for comment, and upon
request, public hearings.' 26 The President must request advice from the
appropriate private sector prior to taking any action, 27 and may request
a probable economic impact report from the ITC. 28 Section 301 allows
the President to take expeditious action if he believes it is required. 29 In
such a case hearings are still held, albeit after action has been taken. 30
122 Id. § 2006.5.
123 Id. § 2006.5(b).
124 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1979). The hearings may be held at a later date if
so agreed to by the petitioner. Id. Hearings may also be held at other times following a timely
request therefor made by the petitioner. Id. § 2412(b)(2)(B).
125 Id. § 2414(a)(1). A seven month recommendation period applies to export subsidy mat-
ters, id. § 2414(a)(1)(A); eight months for subsidies other than only an export subsidy, id.
§ 2414(a)(1)(B); twelve months for all other matters other than agreements approved under
§ 2(a) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, id. § 2414(a)(l)(D). If an agreement approved
under § 2(a) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2503(a) (Supp. III 1979), is
involved, the USTR recommendation is to come 30 days after the dispute resolution procedure
is concluded, id. § 2414(a)(1)(C).
126 19 U.S.C. § 2414(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
127 Id. § 2414(b)(2).
128 Id. § 2414(b)(3).
129 Id. § 2411 (c)(1).
130 Id. § 2414(b).
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d Consultations and Dispute Settlement in the GA T7 3' Context
If a GATT agreement is involved, reference must be made to GATT
dispute resolution ,procedures. The principal consultation and dispute
settlement clauses 'of the GATT are Articles XXII and XXIII.13 2 Since
the GATT was not originally intended to become an administrative or-
ganization, Articles XXII and XXIII provide merely an outline of a dis-
pute settlement procedure. After the death of the International Trade
Organization, a more refined dispute settlement mechanism was never
implemented.
Article XII expresses the pervasive GATT concept of consultation.
It provides that:
1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to,
and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding,
such representations as may be made by another contracting party
with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement.
2. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a con-
tracting party, consult with any contracting party or parties in re-
spect of any matter for which it has not been possible to find a
satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1.133
Article XXIII(1), like Article XXII, provides a consultation proce-
dure. The Article XXIII procedure can be utilized by a contracting
party when "any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under [the
GATT] is being nullified or impaired or the attainment of any objective
of the [GATT] is being impeded . . . . 134 Article XXIII(2) provides
additional procedures which are available if consultations do not result
in the resolution of the dispute. It should be noted that the paragraph 1
consultations are a prerequisite to the procedures of paragraph 2. Al-
though not intended at the time of drafting, the Article XXII consulta-
tions, though they differ in certain technicalities, have been deemed to
satisfy the conditions paragraph of Article XXIII.1
35
If consultations fail, the matter "may be referred to the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES."' 3 6  At that point the Parties must (1)
promptly investigate the matter and (2) make recommendations or rul-
131 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. Complete text in force as of
March I, 1969, is reprinted in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRU-
MENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1-76 (1969).
132 For a discussion of all the dispute settlement clauses in the GATT, see generally Jackson,
GA 7Tas an Instrument for the Settlement of Trade Disputes, 61 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 144 (1967).
133 GATT, supra note 131, art XXII (1), (2).
134 Id. art. XXIII (1).
135 See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT 178 (1969). GAIT provides
in part that the contracting party may:
[Wlith a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written represen-
tations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to
be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic
consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
GATT, supra note 131, art. XXIII (1).
136 GATT, supra note 131, art. XXIII (2).
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ings as appropriate. 137 In practice, a panel of experts would be set up to
perform these functions.
If the contracting parties consider that the circumstances are serious
enough, they may authorize a contracting party to suspend the applica-
tion to any other contracting party of such GATT obligations or conces-
sions that are deemed appropriate.' 3 8
As previously mentioned, the GATT articles provide a broad frame-
work for dispute resolution. A major U.S. objective in the MTN was to
devise rules and procedures to insure timely and fair enforcement of U.S.
rights under the GATT and under the new agreements that were being
negotiated. ' 3 9 Dissatisfaction with Articles XII and XXIII of the GATT
was due to "inordinate delays" and the "perception that political and
power relationships influence the results more than the merits of the dis-
pute."' 14° At the MTN major steps were taken to rectify these problems.
The negotiators' resolutions to these and other problems were embodied
in the Texts Concerning a Framework for the Conduct of World Trade
(Framework Agreement). 141
For disputes which will be considered under the central dispute set-
tlement mechanism, the Framework Agreement provides for the estab-
lishment, upon approval of the GATT Council, of panels to review
disputes. The size and composition of the panels, the powers of the
panels, the general timing requirements for panel review, and the general
procedure for resolution of disputes in the context of the consultation
and dispute settlement provisions of GATT Articles XXII and XXIII are
also detailed in the Framework Agreement. The panels are to be com-
posed of three to five impartial members from countries which are not
involved in the dispute. Each panel generally has the authority to review
the case at hand using its own working procedures while consulting regu-
larly with the parties to the dispute and any technical experts who may
provide assistance. To insure more rapid resolution of the dispute, a
three month time limit for panel determinations is set as a general guide-
line. Panel recommendations of fact and law are submitted to the Coun-
cil, which reviews the panel decision and either provides guidance to the
parties to the dispute or makes a ruling on the dispute. The Council may
also authorize retaliation.
137 Id. The "ruling" language seems to imply a power to interpret the agreements.
138 Id. Art. XXIII (2) reads in relevant part:
If the application to any contracting party of any concession or other obligation is
in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty
days after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary of
the Contracting Parties of its intention to withdraw from [the GATT] and such
withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day following the day on which
such notice is received by him.
'39 S. REP. No. 249, supra note 115, at 233, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 618.
40 Id.
141 Id. H. Doc. No. 96-153, Part 1, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 1,621-661 (1979). The Framework
Agreement was approved in § 2(a) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2503(a)
(Supp. III 1979).
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Not all disputes are considered under the Framework Agreement.
Some disputes will be considered under the specific dispute settlement
procedures contained in the other MTN agreements. The following
characteristics, however, are common to all the agreements:
(1) Timing guidelines are given for the dispute settlement process to
prevent parties to a dispute from delaying decisions by a panel or a com-
mittee of signatories.
(2) Consultation provisions are included which outline principles for
bilateral and multilateral consultation prior to establishment of an im-
partial dispute panel.
(3) The right to a panel is provided in each of the agreements. Panels
are to be composed of experts who act in their individual capacities.
(4) Panels are to review the dispute and make findings of fact and law.
(5) Panel findings are sent to the committee of signatories for final de-
cision which may include authorization to retaliate if a party refuses to
change the practice found to be in violation of the agreement or the
agreement otherwise permits it.
Dispute settlement mechanisms and time limits vary under each
agreement. The agreement relating to subsidies and countervailing
measures contains the most stringent time limits, providing for comple-
tion of the dispute process within approximately 120 days after the con-
sultation and conciliation period. Other agreements, however, provide
for completion of the process within three to six months after the consul-
tation and conciliation period. Each agreement may also vary slightly
with respect to the composition and powers of the panel, the process for
panel review, use of additional technical experts to advise panels on de-
tails outside their areas of expertise, and the relationship of the panel to
the respective committees of signatories.
There is no provision in the GATT for direct participation by pri-
vate parties. Through the section 301 procedure, however, private par-
ties can spur the U.S. Government to exercise its rights under the GATT.
Of course, many disputes will occur outside the GATT framework.
If a bilateral trade treaty is involved, it will be necessary to rely on the
treaty's specific dispute resolution procedures. If there is no trade agree-
ment in place, an ad hoc proceeding will be instituted that may or may
not extend beyond consultations.
3. Example of App/'ation
The recent Canadian broadcasters case provides a good example of
the operation of section 301 where a trade agreement is not involved.' 42
In that case, the longstanding business relationships between U.S. border
broadcasters and their Canadian advertisers were disrupted by enact-
ment in Canada of legislation designed to strengthen the Canadian
broadcast industry as an aspect of Canadian culture. The law denied
U.S. broadcasters access to a substantial portion of the advertising mar-
142 43 Fed. Reg. 39,617 (1978).
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ket in Canada, amounting to between twenty and twenty-five million
dollars annually. 143 Fifteen U.S. television licensees filed a section 301
petition, and the STR subsequently initiated an investigation.' 44 The
petitioner requested public hearings which were held twelve weeks later.
Consultations were held between American and Canadian broadcasters
and between the U.S. Government and the Canadian Government, in
order to seek a solution which would address the Canadian cultural de-
velopment objective without adversely affecting the U.S. broadcasting
stations. These consultations, however, were unsuccessful.'
45
In June, 1980, the STR requested comments concerning the actions
proposed by the petitioner to the President.' 46 The proposed actions
were:
Imposition of special duties on all Canadian feature films and records
exported to the United States;
Imposition of quantitative restrictions on Canadian feature films and
records exported to the United States;
Support by the Administration of tax legislation which would disallow,
for purposes of U.S. income taxes, deductions of the costs of advertising
on Canadian television or radio;
Support by the Administration for the continuation of section 602 of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 which limits, for the purposes of U.S. income
taxes, deductions for expenses incurred attending conventions abroad;
Adoption of a policy which would require consideration of the unreason-
able nature of the Canadian tax restriction imposed by § 19.1 of the
Canadian Income Tax Act, when dealing with Canada on matters of
mutual concern. 14
7
These hearings were held July 9, 1980. The President made his de-
cision on August 1, 1980.148 He determined that the most appropriate
response was to
propose legislation to Congress which, when enacted, would mirror in
U.S. law the Canadian practice. The legislation would amend the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code to deny income tax deductions for the costs of
advertising primarily aimed at U.S. audiences and placed on broadcast
stations located in a foreign country if a similar deduction under the
income tax law of that country is denied for advertising principally
aimed at its audience and placed on U.S. broadcast stations. This re-
sponse was considered the most appropriate, as it was directed at those
interests in Canada which benefitted from the denial resulting from en-
actment of [the Canadian law] on Canadian advertising revenues to
U.S. border broadcasters.1
49
143 Presidential Memorandum of July 31, 1980, for the United States Trade Representa-
tive, repn'nfrd n 45 Fed. Reg. 51,173 (1980).
144 Id.
145 Presidential Memorandum, supra note 143.
146 45 Fed. Reg. 42,107 (1980).
147 Id.
148 See Presidential Memorandum, supra note 143.
149 Id. at 51,173-74.
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B. The Breadth of Section 301-Appcation to Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards
The President, under section 301(a)(2), "may respond to any act,
policy, or practice of a foreign country or 'nstrumentaity that. . . is unjus-
tifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United
States commerce."' 50 It is not a strained interpretation to find a court of
a foreign country to be an "instrumentality" of that country. Further,
given the expansive definition "commerce" has received in U.S. courts,
non-enforcement of an award, judgment, or ordered performance could
easily be found to affect U.S. commerce.
The legislative history defines "unjustifiable" and "unreasonable" in
terms of U.S. trade agreements.151 The U.N. Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards is arguably a trade agree-
ment as its implementation affects commerce. Hence, any signatory
which does not enforce a properly rendered arbitral award conceivably
would be subject to action under section 301.
If the non-enforcing party is not a signatory of the Convention or if
enforcement of a judgment is sought, all hope is not lost. Section 301
also speaks of any "discriminatory" act which burdens or restricts U.S.
commerce. If the foreign court has enforced some foreign judgments or
awards that were rendered in the same manner as the judgment at issue,
a good case for discrimination could be made.
Conclusion
Dispute settlement mechanisms have been devised for application to
most forms of international trade, including the most common types of
disputes. Hence, it is unwise to fail, to consider the efficacy and propriety
of these systems to resolve specific problems.
The private international trader must intelligently weigh the utility
of dispute resolution in the courts against that of arbitration. The trend
towards arbitration was first marked by the growing use of the ICC
Rules and Court of Arbitration by Western nations. Today the trend
toward a worldwide system of dispute resolution recently has been accel-
erated by development of the UNCITRAL Arbitration rules. Dispute
resolution involving non-Western nationals is likely to increasingly in-
volve this model.
Section 301 will also prove useful to American international traders.
In contradistinction to private dispute resolution, section 301 does not
supplant traditional dispute resolution systems; instead, it creates an en-
tirely new opportunity for American businessmen to protect their
interests.
150 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979) [emphasis added].
151 S. REP. No. 249, supra note 115, at 234-35, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at


